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In this article we argue that whilst international studies broadly construed has benefitted in 
recent years from a turn to theories of affect, a notable absentee in this regard has been 
critical accounts of international development. We suggest that theories of affect have much 
to contribute to an understanding of a set of international policies and practices that seek to 
remake individual and collective capacities to act in the pursuit of ‘development’. The article 
therefore sets out to briefly establish a genealogy of affect written through post World War 
Two international development policies, before laying out three areas where contemporary 
international development policy, in the form of the United Nations Sustainable development 
Goals, manifests most notably. These three areas are (i) Partnership; (ii) Capacity Building 
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and (iii) Big Data. We provide evidence to illustrate how affect works to create embodied 
resonances and intensities that circulate socially between and through bodies and create new 
intimate connections, imaginations, and certain kinds of citizens, and in so doing creates 
political enclosures, but also opportunities to produce ‘counter-affects’ and other-form ways 
of being and living. 
 





In recent years there has been an increasing amount of scholarship concerned with Affect and 
International Studies. For the most part, this scholarship has focussed on two related topics: 
a) The epistemological challenge represented by the foregrounding of emotion in the 
study of international relations; 
b) The political production of affective communities driven by a variety of different 
emotions i.e. fear, hope, love, etc. 
Two gaps remain in this ‘turn to affect’. Firstly, the prevailing literature on affect and 
international studies remains relatively narrow, defining affect in relation to the realm of 
emotions, rather than affect understood more broadly as “the capacities to act and be acted 
upon” (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010: p.1). Secondly, this is a literature which has largely been 
confined to the deconstruction of IR as a disciplinary paradigm, and/or critical security 
studies. Whilst sympathetic to the critique of IR which holds that ‘few realms are more 
infused with emotion’ (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014: 494), i.e. fear, aggression, etc., we also 
believe that theories of affect may have a lot more to offer for a more grounded study of the 
international. Additionally, in this paper we argue that as much as the emotional has begun to 
penetrate into important IR debates, one surprising area where there is a lack of scholarship 
concerning affect is international development. This, we argue, is a surprising gap in the 
literature given the broadly affective nature of historical and contemporary development 
policy, which has sought to not simply therapise (Chatterjee, 2004: 36-38) or depoliticise 
(Escobar, 1995: 88) the subjects of development (‘the poor’, ‘people living in poverty’, etc.), 
but also to actively and affectively remake individuals in the image and imagination of 
prevailing development orthodoxy. As such, in this article, we build on scholarship that 
explores affect on a broader terrain than that of simply emotion, to define affect as a ‘force’ 
(see also Lofgren 2014; Gregg and Seigworth, 2010; Mankekar and Gupta 2016) comprised 
of embodied resonances and intensities that circulate socially between and through bodies to 
create new intimate connections, imaginations, and certain kinds of citizens, be they 
entrepreneurial, fearful, or otherwise. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section introduces the relationship between 
affect and IR which serves as a backdrop to the following section that situates the role of 
affective politics in the international development field. This second section provides a 
genealogy of affect in post-World War Two modernisation theory-inflected development 
orthodoxy, which constructed sets of people-as-objects, in need of development. The third 
and main section analyzes a range of affective practices that have opened up since the turn of 
the century, characterised by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
We emphasize that these practices have been harnessed in the transition to the Sustainable 
Development Goals era where the affective politics of partnership, capacity-building, and big 
data are particularly prominent components of the SDG framework.  
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(i) IR and an ‘Affective Turn’ 
In this section we will briefly highlight the two main ways in which affect has become 
prominent in IR scholarship, both of which cohere around affect-as-emotion. Whilst we 
broadly sympathise with the claims made by the scholars we consider below, we will further 
argue that deploying affect-as-emotion limits the ways in which affect can contribute to IR 
and International Studies scholarship. 
 
In 2014 the journal International Theory published a special forum on emotions and world 
politics. This collection of commentaries is broadly representative of the macro-level 
concerns which have recently been animating the turn to affect in IR. In sum, the contributing 
scholars to this forum take a more or less collective view that a consideration of emotion can 
perform two functions. First, it can reveal how collective norms are generated and what they 
do. Neta Crawford for instance seeks to explain how states internalise particular emotional 
predispositions, and the kinds of politics these make possible and impossible (2014), whilst 
Mattern writes of her conviction that there is a relationship between ‘emotion, collectivities, 
and action’ (2014: 589). The second core function which emerges through this collection is 
that a focus on emotion can contribute to a deconstruction of IR as a discipline of universal 
claims which are themselves fundamentally emotional (i.e. all states act selfishly because all 
people are fundamentally selfish), in order to open up a vista of multiple collective emotional 
affinities, ‘multiple co-existing emotional worlds…the multiple legacies of thinking, doing, 
being, and relating that are normally not appreciated in Eurocentric scholarship’ (Ling, 2014: 
579). Recognising the inter-constitutionality of these co-existing emotional worlds, Ling 
further argues that ‘from such mutual embeddedness, dialogue across multiple worlds of 
emotions can facilitate understanding and even solve conflicts in a way a dominant single 
narrative cannot’ (Ibid: 582). 
 
A more grounded approach to affect and IR can be found amongst scholarship in critical 
security studies, where various contributions have highlighted the place of emotions and 
affective ties in constructing communities of fear or hope, with implications for communal 
and national identity and policy-making (for instance, Hutchinson, 2010; 2013; Åhälla and 
Gregory 2013; 2015). Others have explored the place of emotions in contributing to security 
policies and the securitisation of certain issues (for instance: Reinke de Buitragoa, 2016; Van 
Rythoven, 2015).1 Like the more macro-level literature considered above however, in the 
main this security-studies scholarship refrains from expanding the scope of affect theory from 
the strictly emotional to explore issues of how capacities to be, know and act are created 
through sometimes social, sometimes non-social relations (for an exception see: Anderson 
and Addey, 2011).   
 
Other scholarship on affect underscores the relationship between affect and politics in 
important ways. For example, a more grounded approach to affect can be identified in the 
work on the affected dimensions of geopolitics and everyday life, including those concerned 
with physical sites of geopolitics (Pain and Smith 2008) and cultural analysis (Lofgren 2014; 
Massumi 1995). Nigel Thrift (2000), for example, has called attention to the everyday 
workings of geopower by attending to objects, to the human body, and to matters of affect, as 
opposed to the privileging of texts and images. In this context, Squire (2015: 146) notes that 
such studies emphasize the importance of moving beyond a representational/non-
representational divide. In the field of cultural studies, and more specifically non-
                                                             
1 There is a related literature on affective ties in the social movements literature. See for 
instance Currans, Schuler and Willougby-Herard, 2012.  
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representational theory, Lofgren (2014: 78) emphasizes that a focus on the “how” rather than 
the “why” of social action pays less attention to codes and representations and more to 
everyday practices, sensibilities, and feelings. The latter can lead to understanding the 
making and remaking of everyday life, and the ways that objects, people, feelings, 
sensibilities or activities co-exist.  
 
A broader definition of affect that is commonly applied in IR scholarship thus sees affect as 
that collection of visceral forces that operate ‘beneath, alongside, or generally other than 
conscious knowing’, which drive humans and non-humans ‘toward movement, toward 
thought and extension’ or can suspend, or leave us ‘overwhelmed by the world's apparent 
intractability’ (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010: 1). As social beings, we are always immersed in 
and among these forces, which can act as much as blockages for certain and alternative ways 
of being and acting, as they can act as invitations to do the same. In this regard, viewing 
affects as forces enables researchers to explore the in-betweenness of human actors and of 
humans and objects (see Lofgren 2014:74). As Gregg and Seigworth (2010) emphasize, 
affect is about reactions and communications which can compel us towards movement or 
thought—a fleeting mood, an unexpected sensibility, a clambering impatience or anxiety. 
Similarly, Ngai (2005; see Vukov no date) considers affect as a less subjective, a-signifying 
set of embodied resonances, sensations, and intensities that circulate socially between and 
through bodies and accumulate to form a kind of backdrop, tone, or climate. In terms of the 
relationship between intensities and affect, Mankekar and Gupta (2016: 24) suggest that 
affect is a series of intensities “that circulate between bodies and objects and between and 
across bodies”, and that can transform experiences of time and temporality and landscapes of 
close encounters.  
 
As such we can see that affect is not simply reducible to observable emotions but to the 
whole range of submerged and non-conscious, stimulated feelings which might facilitate 
particular actions and practices. For Massumi, affect is neither passive, precisely because it 
induces movement, but it is also not active, because it is not-yet-activity, and as such cannot 
be operated and directed (Massumi, 1995). Affect is thus known by its effects, a reason 
perhaps for Mattern’s stark admittance that, despite being convinced of the place of emotions 
as an explanatory factor in world politics, ‘…the best work on emotion collapses without 
much pressure. Even my own work collapses’ (2014: 586). And yet this is once again perhaps 
because observed emotion is not the same as unobserved affect, and a theory of emotion is 
not really the end point, because emotion itself is a product of affect.  
 
So while affect and emotion are of course related, affect, unlike emotion:  
 
…cannot be understood solely in terms of a symptom of ideology, mode of 
production and emotional manipulation…a set of practices that manipulate 
subjects and their emotions as ways of reproducing the conditions and structures 
of production. By contrast to subjects’ emotion, affect is apparent to the body in 
ways apart from signifying form and structure. Affect is intelligence that inheres 
in what is sensed, but has not been signified in knowable forms and determinate 
structural positions (Dia Costa: 2016: 4).  
 
Emotion then, ‘is the articulation of affect and ideology…the ideological attempt to make 
sense of some affective productions’ (Grossberg, 2010: 316). Turning to how an affect 
paradigm might be applied to an analysis of international development orthodoxy, it would be 
necessary to identify the affective content of this orthodoxy, and its embodied and visceral 
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effects. To be clear though, this is not the same as drawing straight lines of causation between 
international development orthodoxy and the embodied expressions of developmental 
subjects. Rather, it is to seek to understand the affective content of this orthodoxy, and then to 
trace its effects, however they manifest, and with whatever else they interpolate, in their full 
range of unexpected, contradictory and/or self-reinforcing expressions. This is an agenda that 
moves beyond what we are able to address in this one article, but we hope that along with 
others this is an agenda we will be able to move forward with as the contemporary paradigm 
of the Sustainable Development Goals unfolds in subsequent years. What we offer here then 
is a starting point or platform upon which such an agenda might stand. To begin with, we 
next offer a brief genealogy of the affective politics of post-World War Two international 
development orthodoxy. 
 
(ii) Towards a brief genealogy of the affective politics of Post World War Two 
Development Orthodoxy 
There is no significant literature which brings affect theory to bear on the subject of 
International Development. This is surprising given the historical record of development 
policy and practice, which, in ever bolder terms, has sought to construct ‘developed’ subjects, 
with new feelings, capacities and practices. In this section we seek to map out this history of 
affective politics. 
 
Post-War Modernisation Theory 
Modernisation Theory, most popularly associated with North American social scientists and 
economists such as Walt Rostow, heavily influenced post-World War Two development 
orthodoxy. Briefly, the theory contended that development was synonymous with capitalism, 
liberal-democratic norms and a Weberian sensibility towards work, savings and consumption. 
There are well-rehearsed critiques of both the ideological structure upon which modernisation 
theory stands and the post-war development orthodoxy modernisation theory spawned. 
Whilst Kiely (1995: Chapter 3) for instance brings our attention to the contradictions which 
beset modernisation theory (most notably that it contains no account whatsoever of the 
centrality of empire and appropriation to modern capitalist development in the West), and 
Escobar (1995) to the relationship between post-war development discourse, racism and neo-
imperialism, neither of these broadly representative lines of critical scholarship pay attention 
to the affective content of post-war development orthodoxy. In other words, we are not left 
with an account of either the ways in which post-war development orthodoxy sought to create 
capacities to act amongst object populations (transforming these objects into particular 
subject-categories), nor how these affective agendas brought counter-affects and counter-
capacities into play which acted as more or less explicitly resistant blockages to the post-war 
development project. 
 
Whilst it is beyond our ability here to provide more than a speculative account of such 
counter affects and practices, key source texts of post-war development orthodoxy provide 
rich detail on the kinds of affective capacities key protagonists in this process sought to build 
amongst what were arguably considered in these texts as the object populations of the Third 
World i.e. populations groups which could be manipulated and shifted to create desired 
macro geo-political and economic outcomes. Importantly however, these manipulations were 
also conceived as micro-affects, taking place at the level of the individual body and mind. 
Only with this rather Weberian conception of development as personal-before-social change 
could the broader macro-agenda be achieved.  
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In their influential text The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba reflect on the factors necessary 
for the reproduction of Western liberal democracy in the developing world. They identify the 
existence of three ideal-typical political cultures: parochial cultures, subject cultures, and 
participant cultures. The first predominates in the Third World, where people prioritise 
familial and kin ties, the second in the Communist world, where the vitality of populations is 
at the whim of an authoritarian form of government, and the last is characteristic of the West, 
where people act as active citizens (Almond and Verba, 1963: 17-22). As ideal types, 
Almond and Verba argue that in practice even Western liberal democracies are a mixture of 
the three different cultures, each acting to modify each other. As a result, whilst Third World 
societies lack much in the way of even subject, let alone participant culture, even Western 
liberal democracies exist at the intersection of several, sometimes contending impulses, 
whereby the individual in these societies is “not the active citizen: he is the potentially active 
citizen” (Ibid: 347, emphasis added). Pessimistic about the prospects of Third World societies 
to even reach this point (due to the relative lack of time given over for their development), it 
is within this gap, between the ideal-type of the active citizen, and the individual-as-
potentially active, that post-war international development orthodoxy sits as it attempts to 
affect capacities amongst the individual objects of Third World (not-yet) societies. Rostow, 
more implicitly, also engages in this ‘not-yet’ analysis that development orthodoxy seeks to 
address. Although generally more renowned for his 1960 work The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, it was in later works where the more affective content 
of his analysis emerged more explicitly. It is a particular set of affective practices – religion 
and magic – which for instance holds Third World societies back from their developmental 
and democratic potentials (1971: 31). Once again, it is a different set of affective capacities, 
ones which are “more recognizable” (Ibid: 33) which could set Third World Societies on the 
path to active participative democracy.  
 
But where Almond and Verba are pessimistic, Rostow, possibly because he has actually 
thought to travel in and study the aspects of the societies of which he talks (Almond and 
Verba’s case studies for The Civic Culture were the UK, US, Italy, West Germany and 
Mexico), writes with great optimism about the prospects of democratic development in these 
societies. And his optimism is based precisely on a visceral projection of affective 
commitment to the ideals of participative democracy. It is the “dignity and conviction” with 
which people wait to vote; the “shrewd and passionate faces” of the people who have 
committed to make a better life for themselves and their families (Ibid: 301). Such visceral 
expressions are taken to indicate the affective capacities and emotional desires of Third 
World objects to become subjects, to leap from the potentially active to the active citizen. . 
Another seminal text in post-War development orthodoxy, President Harry Truman’s second 
inaugural address in 19492, lays the groundwork for this leap to occur, for the building of the 
affective capacities of developmental objects-into-subjects. On the one hand, Truman relates 
that Third World objects live in misery, their lives inadequate. They are victims, and their 
lives are primitive and stagnant. In Truman’s words then, the mission of post-war 
development orthodoxy must be to ‘supply the vitalizing force’, and to provoke objects into 
agents of ‘triumphant action’, warriors against ‘their ancient enemies: hunger, misery and 
despair’. 
 
                                                             
2 Available at: 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm accessed on 
9th June 2016. The italicised words which follow are lifted directly from the text of the 
speech 
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Escobar has very methodically critiqued the racialised aspects of Truman’s speech, the ways 
in which it asserts a passive, ‘undeveloped’ world which requires Western animation 
(Escobar, 1995: Chapter Two). The point we would like to dwell on here is this animative 
element. For it is within this that we find post-War development’s affective agenda, an 
agenda which seeks to animate the capacities of Third world objects, and turn them into 
active subjects. These populations are subjects in the sense that they are subjected to a 
particular political and economic orthodoxy, and active in the sense that it is the sincere aim 
of this orthodoxy to inculcate the auto-generative capacities required to sustain capitalism and 
liberal democracy amongst third world object populations.  
 
This is the context in which we understand Truman’s speech. The ‘vitalizing force’ of which 
he speaks quite clearly has affective implications. Contradicting itself however, the kind of 
state-led, infrastructural development characteristic of this era, and the kinds of authoritarian 
regimes that this orthodoxy sustained3, directly counteracted the affective spirit of both 
modernisation theory’s and President Truman’s social and civilisational prescriptions.   
The suppression of its affective content continued through into the next phase of development 
orthodoxy, the era of structural adjustment. Concerned with reorienting development away 
from the state, the policy of structural adjustment veered to the market understood in abstract, 
non-human terms. Although this was the overriding focus of the period, there was, as in the 
previous period, nonetheless an affective agenda at play, and so although critics of 
institutions like the World Bank in this period accused it of dehumanising and technocratising 
development (I.e. Ferguson, 2007: 69-88; Hulme, 2010: 29), we seek here to highlight the 
affective components of the structural adjustment period. 
 
From Structural Adjustment to Human Development 
In this section we seek to treat what are often taken to be two distinct periods in development 
orthodoxy as one. Whilst there are those who see significance in the transition away from the 
economistic structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of the 1980s and early 1990s towards the 
more human development-oriented and ‘good governance’ policies of the late 1990s and 
2000s (see for instance Hulme and Fukuda Parr, 2007), we tend to share the sentiments of 
James Ferguson, who has argued that the World Bank’s expansion of its modus operandi 
from finance ministries to ministries of health or education in the 1990s did not represent a 
meaningful transition in the aims of Bank policies, which remained deregulatory and export-
oriented, and sought improvements in health and education as technical inputs to that end 
(Ferguson, 2007: 69-88. See also Harrison, 2004).  
 
However, both supporters and critics of this supposed transition overlook the fact that there 
was always an element of affective engineering at play in the SAPs approach that 
necessitated a non-state, and ostensibly non-market focus, and that provided a bridge with 
what was to follow in the 1990s and 2000s under the umbrella of the Human Development 
agenda, or the ‘post-Washington Consensus’. From a very early stage, the Bank was attuned 
to the micro-cultural engineering the higher rates of economic growth that structural 
adjustment was designed to produce required. For instance the 1980 ‘Berg’ report (named 
after then head of the Bank’s African Strategy Review Group, Elliot Berg), which set the 
SAPs agenda for Africa, advocated a position that ‘Educated women, even if they do not 
participate in the labor force, can have a significant impact on the country's economy through 
                                                             
3 For a detailed exploration of this relationship and its ramifications see Scott, 1999: Chapter 
Seven 
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lower fertility rates, health information, and more "household production."' (World Bank, 
1980: 81).  
 
These kinds of attempts to create new, economically productive capacities amongst various 
population sub-groups (in this case ‘women’) persisted through the decade. As recognition 
grew that SAPs had led to economic stagnation rather than growth, delivering unto Africa a 
‘lost decade’ (Singer, 1989), these attempts grew to a new pitch, whereby in a retrospective 
of Bank policy through the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s, David Williams could 
write of the Bank’s core mission that ‘[it was to] reconstruct […] the attitudes and behaviour 
of individuals’, based on the belief that ‘it is culture rather than nature that really shapes how 
people act. [The Bank]… has undertaken development interventions designed to rework the 
habits and attitudes of persons’ (Williams, 2008: 88).  
 
In this sense the broad literature on how the good governance agenda that became prevalent 
in the late 1990s has been part of an agenda of undermining and emasculating the state (see, 
for instance, Chandhoke, 1995; Kamat, 2002; Harrison, 2004), whilst raising significant 
issues, has to some degree acted as a red herring. By this we mean that for all the focus on the 
ways in which the development orthodoxy of the 1980s, 90s and early 2000s sought to 
refashion the state into a facilitator of international trade, with non-state providers acting to 
deliver social services, we contend that an equally important component of this agenda was to 
fashion the capacities of individuals and groups within the object societies of development 
orthodoxy. One illustrative area where individual capacity has been a major focus is in 
HIV/AIDS prevention, and in particular voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), which is 
designed to “provide people with an opportunity to learn and accept their HIV serostatus in a 
confidential environment with counselling and referral for ongoing emotional support and 
medical care” (UNAIDS, 2000: 1). In addition, counselling clients are encouraged to discuss 
any sexual partners who themselves might therefore be at risk of contracting HIV, and thus 
benefit from counselling services (Ibid: 3). And yet this attempt to create rational and 
responsible sexual subjects, who, with ‘emotional support’ will ‘learn to accept’ their status, 
and thus decide to self-maximise by reporting their status and those they have had sex with, 
has created an affective politics all of its own, namely shame, whereby uptake of VCT has 
been lowest in those regions with the highest HIV incidence rates (Mutale, et al, 2010: 1). 
This ‘shaming’ ethos has been in large part because of the stigma that attending VCT clinics 
in public view, and revealing one’s health status amongst the community by reporting sexual 
contact with other community members, has engendered (Teklehaimanot, et al, 2016: 1). It is 
but one indicative example of how ‘capacities to act and be acted upon’ (Gregg and 
Seigworth, 2010: 1) are situated within a broad field of social and non-social emotional 
relations, including, in this case, the instigators of social norms; subjects-understood-as-
objects by the aforementioned instigators; the built environment; biological viruses; 
communal and social networks; and so on.   
 
Such human-centred approaches to development reached their high-point at the beginning of 
this century (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr, 2007) in the form of the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals. The goals attracted structuralist critiques which portrayed them as fronts 
for global capitalist appropriation (Saith, 2006; Amin, 2006). However, whilst telling us 
something important about the macro-politics of international development orthodoxy, these 




In relation to the MDGs we have both separately commented on the ways in which the goals 
implicitly constructed people as in need of development and as objects, and then sought to 
create particular capacities in order to turn them into active subjects for a particular vision of 
the world. For instance, Ilcan has argued that the MDGs imagined people living in object 
societies as passive, poorly equipped to ‘fare well in a world full of risk and responsibility’ 
(Ilcan and Phillips, 2010: 867), and thus sought to construct active subjects, ‘ranging from the 
poor and homeless to other participants of development initiatives […] who are increasingly 
made responsible to care for and govern themselves in various capacities, geographic 
locations and social relations’ (Ibid: 856). Similarly, Gabay has argued that there is ‘a logic 
of behaviour-change which exists within the programming of the goals’ and which 
manifested itself in multilateral calls to ‘affect private behaviour…and promote “community 
demand”’ (Gabay, 2012: 1256).  
 
The construction of people in need of development and as objects directly reflects the kinds 
of affective politics that was present in post-war modernisation theory-inflected development 
orthodoxy. The key difference is that turn-of-the-century development orthodoxy was much 
less encumbered by any prevailing Keynesian belief in the state as a vehicle for development, 
which had suppressed the affective politics of post-war development orthodoxy. As a result, a 
whole range of affective practices have opened up during the MDG era, and have been 
developed and finessed in the transition to the post-MDG, Sustainable Development Goal era, 
namely, Partnership, Capacity Building and, particularly prominent in the SDG framework, 
big data. The following section examines the affective politics of the SDGs.  
 
(iii) The Sustainable Development Goals 
The Sustainable Development Goals were launched in September 2015, following three years 
of formal inter-governmental and civil society consultation. Reflecting a much broader 
consultative process than that which preceded the MDGs (although one which was still 
constrictive and problematic – see Death and Gabay, 2015: 602), the resultant list of SDGs 
ran to 17 goals, compared to the 8 MDGs. Like the MDGs, each SDG comes with a subset of 
targets. For instance, Goal 1, ‘End poverty in all its forms, everywhere’, comes with a list of 
7 sub-targets, with 170 sub-targets across all the goals (UN.org). The targets take into 
account different national settings, capacities, and levels of development while 
simultaneously recognizing national policies and priorities. Overall, the SDGs incorporate a 
commitment to reduce inequalities within and among countries, foster sustainable 
consumption and production patterns, and work towards the objective goal of peace, fair 
governance, and justice. The 17 SDGs are considered as universal, focusing on five key 
elements: people, planet, peace, prosperity, and partnership, although Weber, in this issue, 
suggests that this talk of universalism masks a very distinct neoliberal paradigm of capitalist 
development. 
 
The vitalizing force of the SDGs provides a very fertile terrain upon which to explore their 
affective content. Rather than exploring every single target and goal however, we are limiting 
ourselves to only those goals and targets which directly speak to the three themes we argue 
have been particularly prominent in contemporary development orthodoxy, namely, 
partnership, capacity building, and big data. In addition to the goals and targets themselves, 
we also analyse relevant policy documents and speeches where these themes have been 
addressed. We argue that across each theme there are various affective agendas at play, 
including the vitalizing force of creating new intimate connections, imaginations, and 




Since the 1990s, an increase in partnerships among states, international organizations, private 
enterprises, local governments, regional and international bodies, civil society organizations, 
and other actors has been shaping relations between the Global North and South as well as 
across cultural and material practices. These partnerships, largely invigorated by neoliberal 
policies and practices, are commonly promoted as working towards international cooperation, 
collaboration, and coordination. They span diverse social and political fields, including 
development and security, urban planning, migration, and modern consumption. They are, 
however, not apolitical processes as each partner/participant in a partnership relation has a 
history and diverging qualities that link it to the actions of other groups, events, landscapes, 
and bodies of knowledge. Scholarship on the role of partnerships in economic and social 
relations reveals that the emphasis on partnerships themselves work to re-align uneven 
relationships yet can foster unequal power relations between donor and recipient 
(Abrahamsen 2004). They can also work to govern certain risky and vulnerable groups (Kunz 
2013: 1228), reconstitute new objects of knowledge about who, and what, is to be managed 
(Ilcan and Rygiel 2015), and reframe our awareness of how certain economic and social 
achievements can be attained. In other words, such partnerships comprise certain ways of 
thinking of and acting on particular groups and communities, without paying critical attention 
to how these partnerships can work to undermine the rights and political practices of some 
partners. In this way, partnerships comprise complexities of inclusion and exclusion. 
 
The SDGs form an arena from which to examine the role of partnerships. The SDG platform 
calls for a renewed ‘global partnership’, indeed many partnerships at all levels, with all 
countries and stakeholders working in commonality to achieve the goals (see: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17). At the outset, it is understood that 
governments must coordinate with a broad range of global actors, such as local governments, 
regional and international bodies, multinational businesses, and civil society organizations. 
Global partnerships are thought to strengthen institutional arrangements within and across 
national and local governments, involving multiple ministries, departments, and government 
institutions. For example, ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’ operating on a global scale are 
thought of as a necessity to complement governmental responses and leverage new resources, 
whether financial or in kind (see target 17.16 and 17.16). But as we discuss below, global 
partnerships are not only hailed as the way forward in the trajectory of sustainable 
development, but they are imagined as embracing responsible actors who can work together 
in areas ranging from information sharing and human resources to technology, strategy 
design, monitoring and evaluation, and volunteering (see UNV 2016; 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/). In other words, global 
partnerships serve as the possibility of appealing to notions of social and political 
relationality as a means of engaging and understanding the contemporary world of 
development in ways which depoliticize those capacities to act that threaten the status quo of 
broadly capitalist and market-led development. 
Under the SDG agenda, global partnerships influence the making of development objects, 
subjects, and practices through assembling an apparatus of potentialities, imaginations, and 
impacts. These partnerships are enacted through various affective relations which stimulate 
certain groups and spaces in particular ways and reorder our sense of how certain economic 
and social achievements can and should be attained. The making of partnerships can 
accumulate affective value through various entities, such as certain kinds of mobile, 
partnership-inducing entities. For example, on September 18, 2016 The UN, in collaboration 
with the GSMA [Global System Mobile Association] and Project Everyone, announced the 
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launching of the SDGs in Action mobile phone application which provides “a global forum 
through which industry, governments and individual citizens can collectively realize the 
promise of the SDGs”.4 The UN Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public 
Information, Cristina Gallach, stated: “The Goals were adopted by Member States, but it is 
up to everyone – civil society, businesses and citizens alike – to achieve them. That is why 
the SDGs in Action mobile app is so timely. The app will bring the Goals closer to people and 
help make them more understandable and relatable to everyday life”. Thus, through the 
vitalizing force of the SDGs in Action mobile application, global users come together in new 
partnership-based relations to establish an intimate connection between them and the 
everyday importance of the SDGs. Such an application ushers in international communication 
that transmits information and affect in various ways, across distances, and in a manner that 
makes the SDGs feel more authentic in time and space. In this regard, Nigel Thrift (2010: 
294) might consider the SDGs in Action mobile application as forming part of the ‘public 
intimacy’ that is afforded by the development of new media forms which generate new kinds 
of appeal for contemporary consumption. In his words, public intimacy can create “new 
forms of body with capacity to alter to that which was previously unable to be sensed—with 
the corollary that certain objects can no longer be sensed—so producing the potential to 
generate new kinds of charms” (Thrift 2010: 295). As much as mobile applications enter our 
lives through a whole range of mediated platforms and forge new social and political 
landscapes, they are heavily implicated in the contingencies, uncertainties, and intimacies of 
everyday life. However, these implications are uneven. In the case of the SDGs in Action app, 
only those with access to smartphone technology become part of this global partnership, with 
its intimate connections to both other individuals, but also corporate and governmental actors. 
Albeit framed through the affective language of global interconnectedness, political action, 
for these people, also becomes an individualised and rationalised process whereby interaction 
with other users, data miners, data storage companies, etc. becomes mediated through 
individual smartphones. Conversely, by their very exclusion from this form of techno-
partnership, those too poor to own the appropriate technology continue to occupy a vista 
upon which non-individualised forms of political partnership, communality and rights-
claiming might be more unavoidable. Indeed, attempts to incorporate ‘non-connected’ 
people, understood as lacking capacities to communicate, or as the Facebook-backed 
‘Internet.org’ puts it ‘awareness’5, form the basis of contemporary struggles that highlight the 
ways in which development orthodoxy interpolates in affective fields that produce 
orthodoxy-reinforcing and orthodoxy-resisting partnerships6.  
 
Returning to the SDGs, global partnerships stimulate masses of people to become primed to 
imagine the promises of the SDGs and primed to act, in certain groups and in certain ways. In 
an effort to meet the SDGs, responsible actors are alerted to the demands related to a future of 
sustainable development:  
 
Urgent action is needed to mobilize, redirect and unlock the transformative power 
of trillions of dollars of private resources to deliver on sustainable development 
objectives. Long-term investments, including foreign direct investment, are 
needed in critical sectors, especially in developing countries. These include 
                                                             
4 See: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/new-mobile-app-launches-to-
drive-action-on-sustainable-development-goals/ 
5 See www.info.internet.org/en/approach 
6 See for instance the resistance to Facebook’s attempts to introduce free internet access, based on a highly 
circumscribed list of ‘partner’ websites, to India. 
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sustainable energy, infrastructure and transport, as well as information and 
communications technologies. The public sector will need to set a clear direction. 
Review and monitoring frameworks, regulations and incentive structures that 
enable such investments must be retooled to attract investments and reinforce 
sustainable development. National oversight mechanisms such as supreme audit 
institutions and oversight functions by legislatures should be strengthened.7  
 
In this regard, global partnerships are enlisted for envisioning what is possible and for 
affecting what could be. In other words, such partnerships, as a political technology, work to 
change our relations with other objects and bodies in and beyond the development field. As 
such, they make the language and imagination of development work in particular ways and to 
anticipate the engagement of others, of other bodies, knowledges, and practices. Indeed, these 
types of partnerships—in the varieties underscoring the SDG’s apparatus of rule, politicize 
the imagination. The role of the imagination underscoring global partnerships is a key 
component of affective relations and politics. On the one hand, it can contribute to the idea 
that certain partner groups connect to other partner groups in hopeful, generous, or benign 
ways in an effort achieve the SDGs. On the other hand, it can shape the conditions of 
possibility which in turn subjects local bodies and knowledges to the sovereignty of the 
scientific promises of sustainable development. As Nigel Thrift reminds us, “affect has 
always been a key element of politics and the subject of numerous powerful political 
technologies” (2004:64). For us, the political stake in understanding the affective relations of 
SDG-based partnerships lies in better understanding the dynamics of affective practices and 
how they draw on imaginations, spread, and foster masses of people to act on the basis of 
hope, generosity, pleasure, joy, anguish, and other visceral forces (see Gregg and Seigworth, 
2010) that compel people toward movement. In the case of contemporary development 
orthodoxy this is a sanctioned and particular form of partnership-induced movement, based 
on liberal rationalities of self-maximisation, an issue we take up in the following section. 
 
b. Capacity-Building 
Since the late-colonial period, capacity-building has been integral to the ways in which 
capabilities or capacities (skills, training, knowledge) have been built in the international 
development field. Such capacities include skills-training efforts, communication 
technologies, and knowledge enhancement programs. For governing actors that foster such 
capacity-building, it is understood that these capacities are to assist certain people to both 
acquire particular skills and know-how, and to participate in activities and plans that lead to 
social and economic change. There is, however, more to capacity-building than building up 
certain skills, knowledge, energies, and technologies for developing economies. Research has 
shown that capacity-building initiatives often work to govern groups and populations by 
making them become self-regulating and responsible actors through their participation in the 
promises of market-based relations. For example, in the field of food security, capacity-
building subjects farmers, and their ties to communities, national governments, and 
international organizations, to new ways of conducting themselves and connecting to others 
that involve the promotion of entrepreneurial communities (see O’Connor et.al, 2016; 
Sexsmith and McMichael, 2015). These communities link people to world markets in new 
ways, and their emergence provides critical insight into the diverse manner in which localities 
become targets from which to make certain populations more responsible for their actions 
and optimistic about their economic future (even if the latter especially is uneven in how it 
                                                             
7 The Sustainable Development Goals 2016: 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/ (accessed October 15, 2016). 
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materialises). In this regard, drawing on the insights of the governmentality literature and 
critiques of neoliberalism, Ilcan and Phillips (2004) conceptualize capacity-building as a 
technology of neoliberal governance, an apparatus of rule that requires a diverse range of new 
rationalities that aim to “grow” institutional frameworks, enhance the skills of people, and 
transfer knowledge through the formation of new partnerships for international development.  
 
In our conception, capacity-building is a line of force. It can propel certain humans and non-
human entities forward; spread creatively, and; diverge into distinct fields. It can form links 
with disparate phenomena, scales, and rationalities ranging from agricultural development 
and poverty reduction, to state thinking. As we discuss below, capacity-building comprises 
affective change and specific acts, and is integral to the SDGs.  
 
Capacity-building is a key aspect of SDG 17 (‘Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development’). This Goal is sub-divided into 
five components: finance,8 capacity building, systemic issues, technology, and trade.9 The 
term capacity-building is understood to improve global support for the implementation of 
“targeted and effective capacity-building work in developing nations to support nationwide 
plans aimed at implementing all the SDGs.” In this regard, global support concerns the 
bringing together of Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system 
and other actors and mobilizes available resources (see: http://www.mdgmonitor.org/sdg17-
sustainable-development-through-global-partnerships/). As part of this coming together, 
member states are “to strengthen their national institutions to complement capacity-building” 
(see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/capacity-building). Under the SDG 
framework, capacity-building points to the varied efforts to transform and build new 
collaborative ideas, assemble international information and knowledge systems, introduce 
new ways to foster market development and new communities in the developing world, and 
improve global support. For example, capacity-building is recognized in target 17.8 as a way 
to fully operationalize “technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism[s] for least 
developed countries by 2017” (see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17). In target 
17.9, the aim is to enhance developing countries to support national plans and implement all 
the SDGs (see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17). Similarly, among the ‘Means of 
Implementation’ listed under Chapter VI of the outcome document of the Rio +20 
Conference, ‘The Future We Want’, capacity-building is viewed as strengthening technical 
and scientific cooperation. It is also acknowledged as key to the Samoa Pathway for a diverse 
range of areas including climate change, sustainable energy, and financing (see: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/capacity-building). Here, capacity building, 
through its diverse discourses, programs, and plans, works to foster improvement, build 
collaboration, and harness scientific cooperation across the globe. In doing so, it comprises an 
affective ability to travel across vast geographical space and permeate the objectives of 
development politics and organization. Ben Anderson (2010: 6) reveals a similar spatial 
expanse of affect when he stresses that not only can affect itself be bought and sold, but 
‘affective capacities’ can be harnessed across production processes. He gives the example of 
how Web 2.0 companies rely on connecting diffused desires of sociality and expression, 
including affective relations such as friendship and activities of browsing or linking. 
Likewise, Thrift demonstrates that the effectiveness of affective technologies (2007) can 
                                                             
8 In the field of finance, for example, the Microfinance Capacity Building Initiative aims to 
foster market development and innovation by strengthening the ability of microfinance 
institutions to serve diverse groups. 
9 See: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17 
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instill the feeling that subjects are agents of free will and volition (see Anderson 2010: 194).  
 
Not only does capacity-building have an affective ability to travel but it can also promote 
change and movement in other affective ways. Through accountability and monitoring 
mechanisms associated with achieving the SDGs, it can instill the feeling in the partners of 
global development that their participation is equal to other partners, even though many 
partnerships are known to be unequal, hierarchical (Knight and Smith, 2004), and sometimes 
acrimonious (Mckeon, 2009).  
 
At another level, capacity-building can shape the conduct of people and communities by 
encouraging them in certain directions, by blocking or stabilizing them, or by having 
individuals or community members act on their emotions and passions in ways that make 
productive their capacities to participate in certain kinds of international development. 
Amongst other things, such change can induce an optimism about the future. For example, in 
March 2015, the Statistical Commission agreed to establish a High-level Group for 
Partnership, Coordination and Capacity-building for Statistics for the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. Based on the UN Economic and Security Council 2016 Session, 
the High-level Group is tasked with promoting national ownership of the monitoring of 
progress towards the 2030 Agenda and “fostering statistical capacity-building, partnerships 
and coordination” (UN Economic and Social Council, 2016 session, 3 June). In this regard, 
capacity-building can induce an ‘optimism’ (see Berlant 2010: 93) about the future and about 
one’s potential role in bringing about a future that is filled with capacities that constitute and 
transform bodies and the relations between them, including the need for responsible actors in 
global partnerships. As such, it is an affective force—a visceral force that works beneath, 
alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing—that can serve to drive us toward 
movement (Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 1; Massumi 1995).  
 
c. Big Data 
One of the agendas which set the SDG discussions apart from their predecessors around the 
MDGs was the call for a ‘data revolution’. This term was first articulated in the report by the 
High Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP, 2013: Executive Summary), which was given a 
mandate by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to consult on a post-2015 agenda. Ban Ki 
Moon was a prominent supporter of this development, giving a number of speeches on the 
topic following the publication of the SDGs in September 2015 (See for instance Moon, 
2015a; 2015b). An architecture emerged around the calls for a data revolution, driven by the 
United Nations Statistics Division, UNStats, but also including new actors like the 
Independent Expert Advisory Group on the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development, 
which produced a report for Ban Ki Moon called ‘A World that Counts' (2014), and The 
Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, launched in the immediate aftermath 
of the September 2015 UN summit which ushered in the SDG era.  
 
The various actors involved in driving the data revolution agenda broadly cohere around two 
main functions that this agenda should serve. First, it is asserted that better, more 
disaggregated data will improve decision making (Moon, 2015a), enable development 
interventions to reach the poorest (Higher Level Forum, 2013: 23) and help to track 
development indicator progress (Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution 
for Sustainable Development, 2014: 6). Put together these are all interventions which are 
designed to improve development outcomes. Secondly, the data revolution is understood to 
be a way of radically democratising development, primarily at national and sub-national 
levels. In this sense supporters of the agenda argue that data should be used ‘directly by local 
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communities’ as a ‘meaningful vector for change at the grassroots level’ (UNStats, 2015: 3), 
and that this will ‘foster entrepreneurial innovation and empower citizens’ (The Global 
Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, 2015). Put together, these interventions are 
designed to both improve development inputs, but also to achieve something more 
amorphous, which is to ‘promote transparency and ensure accountability’ (UNStats, 2015: 4), 
whereby data can be used by ‘Civil society organisations and individuals to hold 
governments and companies accountable’ (Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data 
Revolution for Sustainable Development, 2014: 18) and ‘to monitor national development 
strategies and results in a universally consistent way’ (HLP, 2013: 24). 
 
The affective implications of all of this might work at two different registers, one more 
obvious than the other. If affect ‘is apparent to the body in ways apart from signifying form 
and structure’ (Dia Costa, 2016: 4) then there are clearly more and less obvious ways in 
which it manifests. More obviously, for instance, the rhetoric around data presented in the 
various expert reports and speeches detailed above sees the ‘revolutionary’ aspect of data 
explicitly as its ability to remake bodies and communities. The first aspect of this is what 
Donna Harraway might call a ‘god trick’ (Harraway, 1988: 582), the desire to and belief in 
the possibility of commanding an all-knowing perspective on a particular issue. Reflecting on 
the limitations of previous iterations of development orthodoxy, the Independent Expert 
Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development notes that ‘It is shocking 
how little is known about some people…Entire groups of people and key issues remain 
invisible’ (2014: 11-12). ‘Visibility’ is a key and shared term here: ‘The poorest and most 
vulnerable people often remain invisible’ argues Ban Ki Moon (Moon, 2015a); ‘No one 
should be invisible’ states UNStats (2015: 8), which advocates for the collection of data ‘at 
the lowest possible level, by sex, age, geography, income (wealth quintiles), disability status, 
ethnicity, indigenous status and other vulnerable social groups, and, if and when the need 
arises, by other categories and groupings’ (Ibid: 3).  
 
Quite apart from the ‘predictive fallacy’ of big data, whereby ‘all data provide oligoptic 
views of the world’ (Kitchin, 2014: 4), what is it that these agencies wish to see? On the one 
hand this is unanswerable, for the data revolution is of course designed to fill a knowledge 
gap about the objects of development. But on the other hand there is an assumption about the 
kinds of people who will take up the opportunities this data revolution offers. They will be 
entrepreneurial, innovative and empowered (The Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development Data, 2015). They will be analytically creative (UNStats, 2015: 4). They will 
also, and importantly, be ‘citizens’ (The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development 
Data, 2015), empowered to ‘make better decisions for themselves’ (Independent Expert 
Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development, 2014: 18). This 
confluence of entrepreneurial citizens making ‘better decisions’ is arguably representative of 
the ways in which ‘the figure of the citizen is lost’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2015: 8) in discussions 
around big data, whereby the citizen here is summoned, rather than responded to. It is a 
figure “whose conduct already pertains to good civic behaviour such as participation…an 
already present figure” (Ibid). Actual citizenship, where an embodied subject of experience 
makes various rights claims, is here lost as the citizen becomes “a problem of government: 
how to engage, cajole, coerce, incite, invite, or broadly encourage it to inhabit forms of 
conduct that are already deemed to be appropriate to being a citizen” (Ibid). The SDGs 
apparatus illustrates how this engagement is carried out in an affective field whereby calls to 
innovate, connect, and be creative are designed to induce movement towards certain kinds of 




While there exists an historical record of development policy and practice that has 
endeavoured to assemble ‘developed’ subjects with new feelings, capacities, imaginations, 
and practices, we have argued that there is no noteworthy literature that brings affect theory 
to bear on the field of international development. We have conceptualized affect as a ‘force’ 
(see also Lofgren 2014; Gregg and Seigworth 2010; Mankekar and Gupta 2016) comprised of 
embodied resonances and intensities that circulate socially between and through bodies and 
create new intimate connections, imaginations, and certain kinds of citizens. With this 
definition in mind, our analysis has focussed on the micro-affects of modernization theory 
and structural adjustment and human development orientations. The affective politics 
characterizing post World War II development orthodoxy, including an emphasis on 
animating the capacities of Third World objects and turning them into active subjects, led us 
to turn attention to the affective practices that have opened up since the turn of the century 
and which have been characterised by the United Nations MDGs. We have argued that these 
practices have been harnessed in the transition to the Sustainable Development Goals era 
where the affective politics of partnership, capacity-building, and big data are powerfully 
obvious components of the SDG framework. For example, we have revealed that global 
partnerships are enacted through affective relations that stimulate certain groups in diverse 
ways and reorder our sense of how economic achievements can be attained in ways that draw 
on the imaginations of people to act on the basis of hope and other visceral forces that compel 
people toward movement. Likewise, we have emphasized that the affective practices and 
rhetoric around big data have shown their ability to remake bodies and communities, and to 
foster new entrepreneurial, innovative, and empowered citizens.  
 
Contributing to the development literature and to the scholarship on affect, our paper has 
demonstrated the various ways in which development discourses and practices have 
constituted certain populations in order to fix them, affectively, spatially, and temporally. 
Moreover, it has revealed that affective politics is a complex and ongoing set of processes 
that is ‘other’ oriented and animates the capacities of active subjects, and cannot exist outside 
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